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ABSTRACT
This paper considers a firm that must issue common stock to raise cash
to undertake a valuable investment opportunity. Management is assumed to
know more about the firm's value than potential investors. Investors
interpret the firm's actions rationally. An equilibrium model of the issue-
invest decision is developed under these assumptions. The model predicts
that firms may refuse to issue stock, and therefore may pass up valuable
investment opportunities. The model suggests explanations for several
aspects of corporate financing behavior, including the tendency to rely on
internal sources of funds, and to prefer debt to equity if external financing
is required. Extensions and applications of the model are discussed.
STOCK ISSUES AND INVESTMENT POLICY WHEN
FIRMS HAVE INFORMATION THAT INVESTORS DO NOT HAVE
Stewart C. Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf-/
Consider a firm that has assets in place and also a valuable real
investment opportunity. However, it has to issue common shares to raise
part or all of the cash required to undertake the investment project. If
it does not launch the project promptly the opportunity will evaporate.
There are no taxes, transaction costs or other capital market imperfec-
tions.
Finance theory would advise this firm to evaluate this investment
opportunity as if it already had plenty of cash on hand. In an efficient
capital market, securities can always be sold at a fair price; the net
present value of selling securities is always zero because the cash raised
exactly balances the present value of the liability created. Thus, the
decision rule is: take everypositive-NPV project, regardless of
whether internal or external funds are used to pay for it.
What if the firm's managers know more about the value of its assets
and opportunities than outside investors do? As we will show, nothing
fundamental is changed so long as managers always follow the decision
rule just noted. The shares investors buy will be correctly priced on
average, although a particular issue will be over or underpriced. The
manager's inside information creates a side bet between old and new
stockholders but the equilibrium issue price is unaffected.
However, if managers have inside information there must be some
cases in which that information is so favorable that management, if it
acts in the interest of the old stockholders, will refuse to issue shares
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even if it means passing up a good investment opportunity. That is, the
cost of issuing shares at a bargain price may outweigh the project's NPV.
This possibility makes the problem interesting: investors, aware of their
relative ignorance, will reason that a decision not to issue shares
signals "good news." The news conveyed by an issue is bad or at least
less good. This affects the price investors are willing to pay for the
issue, which in turn, affects the issue-investment decision.
The problem is to figure out the equilibrium share price conditional
on the issue-investment decision, assuming rational investors, and also a
rational firm which bases the issue-investment decision on the price it
faces. This paper addresses that prob:lem, and solves it under reasonable
simplifying assumptions.
The assumptions are set out and discussed in Section 1. This
section also contains two numerical examples. A general formulation
and solution is given in Section 3. The last section describes ex-
tensions of our model and summarizes its implications.
We defer the customary introductory review of the literature until the
end of Section 2, after our assumptions have been more fully explained.
1. ASSUMPTIONS AND EXAMPLES
We assume the firm (i.e., its managers) has information that investors
do not have, and that both managers and investors realize this. We take
this information differential as given--a fact of life. WIe side-step the
question of how much information managers should release, except to note
the underlying assumption that transmitting information is costly. Our problem
disappears if managers can costlessly convey their special information to
the market.
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The firm has one existing asset and one opportunity requiring
investment I. The investment can be financed by issuing stock, drawing
down the firm's cash balance or selling marketable securities. The sum
of cash on hand and marketable securities will be referred to as financial
slack (S).
Financial slack should also include "debt capacity," defined as the
amount of default-risk free debt the firm can issue. (Discussion of risky
debt is deferred to Section 3.) However, it's simpler for our purposes
to let the firm use risk-free borrowing to reduce the required investment I.
We may thus interpret I as required equity investment.
The investment opportunity evaporates if the firm does not go
ahead at time t = 0. If S < I, going ahead requires a stock issue
of E = I - S. Also, the project is "all or nothing"--the firm can't take
part of it.
We assume capital markets are perfect and efficient with respect to
publicly available information. There are no transaction costs in
issuing stock.
We also assume that market value of the firm's shares equals their
expected future value conditional on whatever information the market
has. The future values could be discounted for the time value of money
2/
without changing anything essential.2- Discounting for risk is unnecessary,
because the only uncertainty important in this problem stems from managers'
special information. Investors at time t = 0 do not know whether the firm's
stock price will go up or down when that special information is revealed
at t = 1. However, this risk is likely to be diversifiable.3/
lie can now give a detailed statement of who knows what when.
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A Three-Date Model
1. There are three dates, t = 1, 0 and +1. At t = -1 the
market has the same information the management does. At t = 0, management
receives additional information about the value of the firm's asset-in-
place and investment opportunity, and updates their values accordingly.
The market does not receive this information until t = +1.
2. The value of the asset-in-place at t = -1 is A = E(A); the
distribution of represents the asset's possible (updated) values at
t = 0. Management's updated estimate at t 0 is a. That is, a is
% 4/
the realization of A.-
3. The net present value (NPV) at t = -1 of the investment oppor-
tunity is B = E(B). The distribution of B represents the asset's
possible updated NPVs at t = 0. Management's updated estimate at
t = 0 is b, the realization of B.
4. Negative values for a and b are ruled out. This makes
sense for the asset-in-place because of limited liability. It makes
sense for the investment opportunity because the opportunity is
discarded if it turns out to have a negative NPV at t = 0. In other
words, the distribution of is truncated at zero.
5. Management acts in the interest of the "old" shareholders, those
old
owning shares at t = -1. That is, they maximize V = V(a,b,E)
However, the market value of the old stockholders' shares will not
generally equal V l d. Let P be the market value. P reflects the
distribution of and B and also management's decision to issue shares or not.
Let
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P' = market value at t = 0 of old stockholders'
shares if stock is issued.
P = market value at t = 0 if stock is not issued.
6. Slack, S, is fixed and known by both managers and the market.
The information available to management and the market is summarized
below:
Date: t = -1 t = 0 t = +1
Information
available to:
Managers Distribut4ons a,b;S a,b; remaining S, if any
of A and B;S
Market Distributions Distributions a,b; remaining S, if any
of and ;S of and ;S;
also E, either
E 0 or
E I -S
Two Examples
The following two examples should give a better understanding of the
problem just posed and the steps required to solve it. In the first
example, the firm always issues stock and goes ahead with a positive
NPV opportunity. In the second example it may not.
First example. There are two equally probable states of
nature. The true state is revealed to management at t = 0 and to
investors at t = +1. Asset values are:
State 1 State 2
Asset-in-place a = 150 a = 50
Investment Opportunity (NPV) b = 100 b -= 10
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The firm has no cash or marketable securities (S = 0). The investment
opportunity requires I = 100, so the firm must issue stock to raise E = 100 if
it goes ahead.
We now examine a trial solution assuming the firm issues stock
and undertakes the project regardless of whether the favorable or unfavorable
state occurs. In that case P' = 155 because A + B = 155.
In state 1, the true value of the firm, including 100 raised from
the stock issue, is 350. That is V - V° ld + Vn ew = 350. The market value
is P' + E (the old shares' market value is P', the new shares' E). Thus
void P' 155V ' + EV = 55 350 = 212.75
P' + E 255
vnew = E 100
Vnew = E V = 100 . 350 = 137.25
P' + E 255
In state 2,
V =Vld+ Vnew = 160
vold 155 160 = 97.25255 '
new = 100 160 - 62.75
255
Note that both old and new shares are correctly priced to investors,
who regard the two states as equally probable.
P ' = 1(212.75 + 97.25) = 155
E' = 1(137.25 + 62.75) = 1002
III
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Because the firm issues stock in both states, the decision to issue
tells investors nothing about the true state.
This trial solution is the equilibrium solution, because issuing
stock and going ahead with the project leaves the old stockholders
better off regardless of the true state:
Issue and Do nothing
Payoff invest (E = 100) (E = 0)
Vo l d in 212.75 150
state 1
Vol d in 97.25 50
state 2
In this example the firm has no use for financial slack. If it had, say,
100 in cash (S = 100) it would make exactly the same investment decisions.
The payoffs to old stockholders, after subtracting their extra 100 invest-
ment in the firm's cash balance, would be:
Payoff Invest Do nothing
Vold in 250 150
state 1
Vold in 60 50
state 2
The state payoffs differ, but expected payoff is identical: 1(2 50 + 60) = 155.
Second example. Let the investment opportunity's NPV be
+20 in state 1. It was 100 in the first example.
State 1 State 2
Asset-in-place a = 150 a = 50
Investment Opportunity (NPV) b = 20 b = 10
Thus A + B = 115 , and P' = 115 if the firm issues stock in
both states. Let's start by assuming it does.
In state 1,
V = Vld + new = 270
vod =(T +E)V = 115 * 270 = 144.42
Vnew = + E)V 215 ' 270 = 125.58E V = 1215
In state 2,
V = Vold + Vnew = 160
vd = 215 . 160 = 8558
ew 100 160 74.42
215
Note that P' = (144.42 + 85.58) = 115 , and E = 1(125.58 + 74.42) = 100.i 2
Now look at the payoffs to old stockholders:
Issue and
invest (E = 100)
144.42
85.58
Do nothing
(E = 0)
150
50
This is somewhat more complicated. With these payoffs, the optimal
Payoff
Vol d in
state 1
voild in
state 2
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strategy is to issue and invest only in state 2, because in state 1, the
market value of the old stockholder's shares is lower when shares are issued.
But if the firm follows this strategy, issuing stock signals state 2 and P'
drops to 60. The equilibrium payoffs are those circled below:
Issue and Do nothing
Payoffs invest (E = 100) (E = 0)
Vold in 144.42
state 1
Vo l d in 50
state 2
Thus the firm passes up a good investment project (NPV = +20) in
state 1. Its market values at t = 0 will be P' = 60 (state 2)
and P = 150 (state 1). The average payoff to old stockholders is
I(150 + 60) = 105 . There is a loss of 10 in firm value -- i.e., at
t = -1, V = 105 vs. 115 in the first example.
In this example, the firm is better off with cash in the bank.
If S = 100 , the payoffs, net of the additional cash investment, are
Payoff Invest Do nothing
Vold in 170 150
state 1
Vold in 60 50
state 2
In this case there appears to be an incentive to leave the cash in
the bank, and issue stock in state 2. But that action would immediately
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reveal the true state, forcing P' down to 60. If the firm does
not have to issue stock to undertake the project, smart investors
will assume the worst if it does issue.
Discussion
The conventional rationale for holding financial slack-- cash,
liquid assets, or unused borrowing power-- is that the firm doesn't
want to have to issue stock on short notice in order to pursue a
valuable investment opportunity. Managers point to the red tape,
delays and underwriting costs encountered in stock issues. They
also typically say,"We don't want to be forced to issue stock when
our firm is undervalued by the market."
A financial economist would respond by asking, "Managers may
have superior information, but why should that be a disadvantage?
If we admit that the firm is sometimes undervalued, then sometimes
it must be overvalued. Why can't firms take advantage of the market
by issuing securities only when the firm is overpriced?"
Our examples suggest answers for these questions: slack
has value in example 2, because without it the firm is sometimes
unwilling to issue stock and therefore passes up a good investment
opportunity. Slack does not allow the firm to take advantage of
investors by issuing only when stock is overvalued. Firms can get
away with that only when they do not have slack sufficient to cover their
investment requirements.
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The value of slack of course disappears if the firm can costlessly
convey the true values a, b to the market. One way to justify our
contrary assumption is to think of cases in which values depend on
proprietary information which, if released to the market, would
be released to competitors also, consequently reducing a and/or b.
The firm cannot convey that information by saying, '"We have great
prospects but we can't tell you the details." In our model, the firm
always has the incentive to do this, so such statements carry no in-
formation. The firm has to supply verifiable detail sufficient to
indicate the true state of nature. The costs of supplying, absorbing
and verifying this detail may be significant.
Slack is clearly unnecessary if the firm has a "private line"
to existing stockholders. However, private communication to all old
stockholders would be difficult and also illegal. Slack is also
unnecessary if the firm can compel its old stockholders to buy and hold
any new issue; in this case the conflict between old and new stockholders
does not exist. 5/
Our crucial assumption is that slack allows the firm to avoid
external financing, and thereby to avoid entangling its investment
decisions in possible conflicts of interest between old and new
shareholders. We take another look at this assumption later in the paper.
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Related Work
Our problem is similar to the one addressed by Ackerloff [1], who
showed how markets can break down when potential buyers cannot
verify the quality of the product they are offered. Faced with the risk
of buying a lemon, the buyer will demand a discount, which in turn
discourages the potential sellers who do not have lemons. But in our
paper, the seller is not offering a single good, but a partial claim on
two, the asset-in-place and the new project. Moreover, the seller
gives up one of them (the new project) if the partialcclaim is not sold.
Without this more complex structure we would have little to say, beyond
noting that securities can be lemons too.
Ackerloff's paper was one of the first investigations of the economics
of unevenly distributed information. The assumption of asymmetric in-
formation underlies extensive recent work on agency costs, signalling,
6/
adverse selection, etc. A detailed review of all that is not needed here.-
However, several articles are directly relevant to our problem:
1. Campbell [4] assumes that firms have proprietary information that
would be costly to convey to the market. He describes the resulting financing
difficulties and possible remedies. His main point is to provide a new
rationale for debt financing througn financial intermediaries. It
may, for example, be possible to reveal proprietary information to a bank
without revealing it to competitors; the bank could then finance a new project
on terms which are fair to old stockholders. This line of analysis is
further explored in Campbell and Kracaw [5].
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However, Campbell does not consider what happens if a firm with proprietary
information does attempt a public issue. He presents no formal equilibrium
model of security pricing and of the financing and investment decisions of
the firm.
2. Leland and Pyle [12] consider an entrepreneur seeking additional
equity financing for a single venture. The entrepreneur knows the project's
expected return but outside investors do not. However, the outside in-
vestors observe the fraction of the entrepreneur's personal wealth com-
mitted to the project, and set their valuation accordingly. The greater the
entrepreneur's willingness to take a personal stake in the project, the more
7/inventors are willing to pay for their share of it.-
3. Bhattacharya and Ritter 3] pose a problem similar to ours, but
end up pursuing a different issue. We fix the extent of managers'
inside information and examine the equilibrium issue-investment decision.
They ask how much information the firm should reveal, assuming that each
revelation provides information to competitors as well as inventors, and
therefore reduces the value of the firm. They show that the firm may
be able to convey its true value to investors without revealing every-
thing its competitors would like to know. However, their search for signalling
equilibria carries them a long way from this paper's analysis.
4. Rendleman [14] also sets a problem similar to ours. His investors
may over- or undervalue the firm's assets or investment opportunities or
misassess its risk. He focuses on the choice between debt and equity fi-
nancing, but does not derive a full equilibrium model. For example, he shows
that undervalued firms will typically prefer debt, but does not model
the market's response to the firm's choice of debt over equity. In general
management's choice of financing must convey information about the firm's
-14-
intrinsic value and actual risk. In our model, however, the firm never
issues equity when it has the option to issue debt, regardless of
whether the firm is over- or undervalued. We prove this later in the
paper.
5. There are other theoretical papers exploring how managers'
inside information is signalled to investors. They include Bhattacharya's
work on dividend policy [2], Grossman and Hart's [10] work on takeover
bids, and Ross's papers on "financial incentive signalling" [16,17], in
which a manager's employment contract leads him to convey information
about the firm's prospects through a choice of its capital structure.
2. THE FORTIAL MODEL
In this section, we give a formal statement and solution of the
model introduced in Section 1. We assume 0 < S < I so that some or
all of the project must be financed by a stock issue. By varying slack S,
we vary the size of the required issue, E = I - S.
If the firm, knowing the true values a and b, does not issue, it
forfeits the investment opportunity, so Vold = S + a. The slack remains
in cash or liquid assets. If it does issue and invest, E = I - S and
III
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old _ P'
old P' + E (E + S + a + b)
Old stockholders are better off if the firm issues only when
P'
S + a < p + E (E + S + a + b)
or when
E P'
P' + (S + a) < P' + E (E + b)
/ Share of existing /Share of increment 
asset and slack < to firm value obtained
going to new | by old stockholders
stockholders /
The condition can also be written:
pt (S + a) < E + b (1)
Thus the line
(S + a) = E + b (la)
divides the joint probability distribution of A and B into two
regions, as shown in Figure 1. If the actual outcome a, b falls in
region M', the firm issues and invests. If the outcome falls in
region M, the firm does nothing.
Remember that the joint probability distribution of a and b is
restricted to the Northeast quadrant of Figure 1. Region M' is at
the top left of this quadrant. The firm issues when b is high and a
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Region M'
(Issue and Invest)
Pt' I
!-
E+b = E, (S+a)
/
I--,'
VI
,,
.,
.-' Region M
(Do Nothing)
a
'-S
Figure 1. The issue-investmentdecision.
b
-S
I
I
I
I
11
I
I
I
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is low. The higher b is, the more the firm loses by not issuing.
The lower a is, the more attractive the issue price P'.
Of course P' itself depends on the probability densities of
(A,B) in the regions M and M'. The stock issue will be fairly
priced to investors if
P' = S + A(M') + (C,') (2)
where A(M') -E(kJIE I - S) and B(M') E(iJE = I - S). These
expectations reflect only the information available to investors:
the distribution of A and i and the decision to issue, which
tells investors that the true values a and b satisfy Inequality (1).
Figures 2 and 3 display the two numerical examples presented above
in the format of Figure 1.
Properties of Equilibrium
These equilibrium conditions explain why the firm may pass up
good opportunities rather than selling stock to raise funds. This
occurs with probability F(M). The ex ante loss in value is
L - F(M)B(M). L = 0 when S > I. Other things equal, L increases
if E, the required equity issue, increases. Since E = I - S,
the loss also increases with the required investment I and decreases
with slack available S.8/
Special cases. "Corner solutions," in which the firm always
issues stock or never issues stock, are rarely encountered in this
model given reasonable joint probability distributions for and .
This occurs because both and are random and have positive
means, and because the investment decision cannot be postponed. The
-18-
b
State 1:
a=150
b=100
100+b = 100
3-55
State 2:
a=50
b=10
P'=155
M
a
+200
E = 100
(E=I-S=100-0)
Figure 2. Solution for Example 1 from Section 2.
Note Region is empty.
+150
+100
+50
III
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b
l b=100a100+b = a60 
M
State
a=50
b=10
State 1:
a=150
b=20
J
2:
0
+100 +150 +200
E = 100
(E=I-S=100-0)
Figure 3. Solution for Example 2 from Section 2.
+150
+100
+50
a
III
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following special cases do give corner solutions, however. First, if
a is known by investors as well as managers, then stock
is always issued when b > 0, and thus L = 0. To show this, first substitute
a for A(M') in Equation (3)
P' = S + a + B(M')
Since B(M') > 0, P' > S + a. The firm will issue stock if
E S + a )< E + b
This condition must be satisfied if b > 0, because (S + a)/P' < 1.
The firm will issue whenever b > 0, and P' = S + a + B.
Thus differential information restricted to investment opportunities
never prevents a stock issue. The terms of sale may be favorable to
the firm (if b > B) or unfavorable (if b < B), but even in the latter
case the firm is better off issuing than losing the project entirely.
Second, if the firm has no investment opportunities ( = 0 in
all states of the world), things break down totally: stock is never
issued, except possibly when a is at a definite lower bound. Let
a i denote a lower bound, and suppose that P' ain + S. With
b = 0, the firm never issues if a > amin, because then
E (S + a)> E
Compare Inequality (1). On the other hand, P' > amin + S leads to
contradiction. If P' = amin + S + e, with e > 0, the firm issues
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only if a < amin + e. Therefore A(M') < amin + e, and P'> S + A(M')
which violates Eq. (2).
If b is positive and investors know its value,
the firm will issue and invest in at least some states where a > amin.
It may issue in all states--that is, if b is large enough and the
distribution of A tight enough, it may issue even if a is at the
upper bound of the distribution of A.
One insight of this model is that you need differential information
about both A and B in order to get interesting solutions. Without
B, stock is never issued except when a = amin . Without , stock is
always issued when b > 0.
Issuing stock always reduces stock price. In this model, the
decision to issue stock always reduces stock price, unless the issue
is a foregone conclusion. That is, P' < P if the probability of
issue is less than 1.0.
Let a* be the breakeven level of a, such that the firm is just
indifferent to issuing or not issuing. Of course a* depends on b.
From Eq. la),
a* + S = P'(1 + b/E)
Note that A(M) + S > a*+ S, because any a < a* would lead the firm
to issue (a < a* implies a* + S < P'(1 + b/E)). Since
P = A(M) + S, P > P'(1 + b/E). Since b > 0 if stock is issued,
P'(1 + b/E) > P' and P > P'.
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Numerical Solutions
The key to a numerical solution is of course P': once we know it,
we can use Eq. (2) to separate regions M' and M. Unfortunately we cannot
guarantee a unique P'--it depends on the joint probability distribution of
9/
a and b.- Nor can we give a more specific analytical expression for P',
although calculating P' by numerical methods is not difficult. The method
we have used is:
1. Start by setting P' = S + A + B. This assumes the firm
always issues stock if b > 0.
2. Then determine the regions M and M' assuming the firm faces
this trial value for P' and acts in the old stockholders'
interest.
3. Calculate a new trial value of P' = S + A(M') + B(M') based
on the regions M and M' from step 2.
4. Continue until P' converges.
This procedure gives the highest equilibrium P'. We have found this to be
a unique solution for joint lognormal distributions of A and , and also
for joint normal distributions truncated to exclude negative is and is.
Table 1 illustrates the results obtained in extensive numerical ex-
periments.-/ It shows L, loss in market value at t = -1, as a percent of
B, the average NPV of the investment opportunity. It also shows F(M'), the
probability the firm will issue stock. and I' are assumed joint lognor-
mally distributed. Note that:
a. Increasing slack reduces L/B and increases F(M').
b. Increasing project NPV (B/I) reduces L/B.
c. Increasing the required investment I increases the loss of
III
-23-
TABLE 1
Calculated Losses in Market Value
When A and X are Joint Lognormally Distributed
Assumptions: A = 100
B = 1 or 10
I = 10 or 100
= 10 or 100A
i= 10
S = 0, 50, 90 or 100 percent of I
X and B are independent
Loss in Market Value as Percent of B
I = 10 I = 100
S B/I
CA=1 A=100 A=1O a=100
99.8 100- 98.5 99.9
0 (0.1) (0+) (1.2) (0.1)
17.8 97.8 2.8 68.8
(68.4) (1.6) (94.1) (23.0)
94.1 100- 68.7 97.1
(3.2) (0+) (21.7) (2.1)
50
10 5.1 84.4 0.4 39.4
(87.0) (11.2) (98.6) (51.7)
19.9 97.0 5.7 65.0
.01 (65.2) (1.9) (85.8) (25.9)
90
0.1 18.7 0+ 5.1
(99.5) (70.5) (100-) (89.6)
.01 0 0 0 0
100 (0) (0) (0) (0)
0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Parentheses contain probability that firm will issue.
Source: Majluf (1978), Table 4, p. 167 and Table 6, p. 169.
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value L/B when B is held constant. For example, compare
L/B for I = 10, B/I = .10 with L/B for I = 100, B/I = .01
(B = 1 in each case).
d. Reducing the standard deviation of assets in place A re-
duces the loss in value. (We showed above that L = 0 when
aA = 0.)
We also experimented with the standard deviation of B and the correla-
tion of and , but found no uniform effects.
Table 2 shows calculated values for L/B and F(M') for less extreme
parameters. A is fixed at 100. Suppose the calendar time between t = -1
and 0 or 0 and +1 is 4 years. It is not unusual to find firms growing 10
percent per year, so required investment is set at I = 40, with NPV = +10.
The correlation between A and B is +0.7--a high correlation between the
values of a firm's asset-in-place and growth opportunities seems realistic.
Finally, the standard deviations of A and B are set at 50 percent of A and B.
The losses in value shown in Table 2 are clearly economically significant.
3. EXTENSIONS AND IPLICATIONS
Having explained our model formally, we can now turn to possible extensions
and qualifications. We also discuss broader issues, for example, the impli-
cations of managers' superior information for capital structure and dividend
policy.
Easy Ways Out
There is of course an easy way out--an easy way tb avoid any loss of market
value: just issue stock at t = -1, when managers and the
market share the same information. That is one lesson of our model.
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TABLE 2
Calculated Losses in Market Value
Assumptions: A = 100
B = 10
A = 50
OB = 5
I = 40
correlation of A, B = +0.7
Loss in Market Value of Percent of B
L/B, loss
in value
63.2
probability
of issue and
investment
.48
.7829.7
7.2
0.2
.95
.998
0.0
-/No issue necessary, probability of investment equals 1.0.
Source: Majluf (1978), Table 18, p. 183.
S/I
(percent)
0
25
50
75
100
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If managers know more than the market does, firms should avoid situations in
which valuable investment projects have to be financed by stock issues.
Having slack solves the problem, and one way to get slack is to issue stock
when there is no differential information.
This is not an easy way out, however, if the information differential
is permanent. Suppose managers are always one period ahead of the market.
At t = - 1, for example, managers would know A and B, but investors would not.
Investors would see A and B as random variables.
Table 3 shows who knows what, when. Values of assets-in-place and
the investment opportunity are now subscripted for time. Note that
a_ = A a-2 = A 1; b = BO b 2 = B 1, etc. The table assumes
that there is only one investment opportunity which must be taken at t = 0
or lost. Also, investors "catch up" to managers at t = +1. Thus Al = al
and B 1 = b.
Assume the firm has insufficient slack to undertake the project,
that the amount of slack is fixed unless equity is issued to increase
it, and that the investment required to undertake the project is known.
Consider the decision to issue E = I - S dollars of stock at
t = -1. If the firm does not issue, its true market value, known to
managers, is V 1 (no issue) = a 1_ + b_l + S - L. If it does issue, Vl(issue) -
a_l + b_l + S + E. A stock issue of E = I - S at t = -1 thus has a net value of L,
because it guarantees the firm will invest if b > 0.
Now redefine the value of assets-in-place at t = -1 as
a*1 + b -al L. Let b*1 - L. b* 1_l is the NPV of investing
E= I - S in cash or marketable securities--i.e., in slack. Managers
know the payoff of investing in slack but investors do not. L is a
random variable from their point of view, because its value depends on
III
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TABLE 3
Information Available to Managers and the
Market When the Market is Always
One Period Behind
Information
Available to:
Managers
-2
a 2_
-1 0 +1
a_l a0 al
A_2 A_1
B_2 B_1 B0
Market
Managers
a1l
Market
b0 blb_l1
b1
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a_1 and bl , which they will not know until t = 0. However, investors do know
the distributions of a 1_ and bl and therefore the distribution of L. That is,
they know the joint distribution of A and B1
This brings us back to the same problem we started with in section 1.
We have "assets-in-place" worth a* = a_ 1 + b_l - L and an "investment
opportunity" worth b*l = L. The joint probability distribution of these
values is determined by the firm's actual assets, investment opportunities
and equilibrium issue-investment strategy. At t = -1, the firm's decision to
issue and the price investors are willing to pay are governed by Eqs. (1)
and (2) with the appropriate starred values inserted. These equations would
also apply in t = -2, t = -3, etc., when expressed in terms of appropriately-
defined variables.
We will not here pursue analysis of the optimal issue strategy in this
dynamic setting. However, we have shown that the problems addressed in
this paper do not go away when the firm has no immediate real investment
opportunity. Given differential information, a firm with valuable future
real investment opportunities is always better off with slack than without
it. Moreover, it should build up slack through retention rather than stock
issues. This is consistent with actual retention policies of most public
firms, which limit dividends so that they will rarely have to go to the
market for fresh equity.
Thus we add one item in favor of the list of possible arguments for
low dividend payout. On the other hand, dividends would alleviate the
problems posed in this paper if they help signal the true value of , thus
reducing A. This is not necessarily an argument for high average payout.
It does support positive payout policies with a high correlation of changes
in dividends and A.
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This could explain why dividend payments respond to changes in earnings,
not market value. Earnings reflect the performance of assets in place.
At this point we revert to our original three-date model, in which
differential information is important only at t = 0.
Debt Policy
Another easy way out is to issue debt rather than equity. If the
firm can issue default-risk free debt, our problem disappears: the
firm never passes up a positive-NPV investment.
If it can only issue risky debt, our problem is only alleviated: the
firm sometimes passes up positive-NPV investments, but the opportunity loss
is less with debt than with equity financing. The general rule is: better
to issue safe securities than risky ones.
This requires more careful discussion. Assume the required investment
I can be financed with debt, D, or equity E. Assume for the moment that
these are two distinct policies announced at t = -1 and adhered to in
t = 0. That is, the firm must choose debt or equity before managers know
the true values a and b.
The firm issues and invests if V , the "intrinsic value" of the
old stockholders' equity, is higher with the issue than without it. If
it does issue, V l d equals the total firm value less the value of the
newly-issued securities.
old
Suppose equity is issued. Then V = a + b + I - E1, where
E1 is the newly issued shares' market value at t = + when investors learn a
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and b. The issue price of these shares is just E = I -S at t = 0. Thus
old
V = S + a + b - (E1 - E) = S + a + b - LE; AE is the new share-holders'
capital gain or loss when the truth comes out at t = +, conditional on the
firm's issue of shares at t = 0.
The firm will issue and invest only if
S + a < S + a + b - E (3)
or if b > AE. The investment's NPV must exceed the capital gain on
newly-issued shares. (Note: AE may be positive or negative. At
equilibrium investors expect it to be zero. The firm knows the true
value.)
If debt is issued, we follow exactly the same argument, with D and D1 sub-
stituted for E and E1, and reach the same conclusion: the firm will issue
and invest only if b exceeds AD - D1 -D. Of course if the debt is default-
risk free, 0P = 0,-/ and the firm always issues and invests when b > 0.
Thus the ability to issue risk-free debt is as good as financial slack.
If the debt is not default-risk free, AD may be positive or negative.
It will have the same sign as AE, but its absolute value will always be
less.-1 2
Now compare the issue-invest decisions for debt vs. equity financing.
Since b>O, the firm will always invest when AD and AE are negative.
Suppose AD and AE are positive (good news in store for investors at t = +1).
If the firm is willing to issue equity and invest, it is also willing to issue
debt (AD < AE, so b > AE => A b > AD). But debt is issued in some states
where equity is not (AD < b < E). Thus the ex ate value of the firm is
higher under the debt-financing policy, because the loss in market value (L) due
III
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to under-investment is less.
Now suppose the choice of debt or equity is not preannounced, but chosen
at t = O, after the firm knows the values a and b. This seems like a
more complicated problem, for their choice could give an additional signal
to investors. It's tempting to say the overvalued firm would issue equity
13/
and the undervalued firm debt. 
In our model, however, the firm never issues equity. If it issues and
invests, it always issues debt, regardless of whether the firm is over- or
undervalued. A proof follows.
The payoffs to old stockholders (V )ld if neither debt or equity is
issued is a + S. The additional payoffs to issuing and investing are b - AE
with equity financing and b - AD with debt financing. An equity issue
therefore signals that b - AE > b - AD, that is AE < D.
Remember that AD and AE are the gains realized by new stock or
bondholders at t = +1 when the firm's true value is revealed. They depend
on a,b,S and the decision to issue and invest. If there is an equilibrium
in which equity is issued, there is a price PE at which investors can
rationally expect AE = 0. For debt, the equilibrium firm value is PD and
investors expect AD = 0. Given a,b and S, AE and AD have the same
sign, but jAE > ADI .
However, there is no equilibrium price PE' at which the firm can issue
stock. It prefers stock to debt only if PE is high enough that AE < AD.
This occurs only if AE < O, implying a sure capital loss for new stockholders.
Therefore, there can be no price P' at which (1) the firm is willing toE
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issue stock rather than debt and (2) investors are willing to buy.
To put it another way: suppose the firm announced at t = -1 that
it would issue debt if it issued any security. It could not change its
mind and issue equity at t = 0. On the other hand, a firm which announced
a policy of equity financing at t = -1 would be forced to change its mind,
and to issue debt at t = 0 if it issued at all. Equity would be issued at
t = 0 only if absolutely ruled out at t = -1; yet we showed above that
precommitting to equity financing is always inferior to precommitting to
debt.
Thus our model explains why many firms seem to prefer internal financing
to financing by security issues and, when they do issue, why they seem to
prefer bonds to stock. This has been interpreted as managerial capitalism
--an attempt by managers to avoid the discipline of capital markets and to
cut the ties that bind managers' to stockholders' interests. In our model,
this behavior is in the stockholers' interest.
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Acting in All Stockholder's Interests
14/Stockholders are better off ex ante, and on average, ex post,
oldif managers maximize V rather than V° d If they act in the interests
of all stockholders at t = 0, they always issue stock when b > 0.
Therefore L = 0. Stockholders would vote for this policy at t = -1 even
though it would sometimes work against their interest at t = 0.
The obvious difficulty comes when new--or old--stockholders attempt
to verify managers' adherence to the policy ex post. The temptation to
depart from it is particularly strong when stock is issued only once and
reputation has no value for the future. In practice, there may be
conventions or institutional arrangements designed to prod managers to
take the long view.
Asset Sale and Repurchase of Shares
Suppose the firm already has invested in two assets worth al1 and a2.
It is t = 0, and the market knows the distributions ~ and ~ but not
al1 and a2. Also,asset 1 can be sold for C.
First assume that selling the first asset requires the firm to use the
proceeds C to repurchase shares. This disinvest-repurchase decision would
be made by exactly the same reasoning as the issue-invest decision dis-
cussed above. The equilibrium conditions are exactly the same except
for changes of sign.
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However, firms are rarely, if ever, committed to use the proceeds of an
asset sale to repurchase shares. If the proceeds can be held as cash until
t = 1, then the decision to repurchase signals investors that the firm's
remaining asset is undervalued at A2. If the firm insists on repurchasing,
it derives P' to A2max' the upper bound of the distribution of A2.
Equilibrium with repurchase could occur only when a2 = A2max and
al < C. (If there's no upper bound, there's no equilibrium.) In this
case, where the only reason for repurchasing is to take advantage of
investors who sell, repurchasing would be extremely rare.
The difficulty here is that repurchase may reward faithful stock-
holders at the expense of unfaithful ones. A pro rata repurchase could
avoid the problem, but in that case, the firm might just as well pay a
cash dividend. A pro rata repurchase is taxed like a cash dividend.
Now turn back to the case in which the firm has one asset in place,
and one investment opportunity, with intrinsic values a and b at t = 0.
However, the asset-in-place can be sold.
If it can be sold for a, without affecting b, then the problems ad-
15/dressed in this paper evaporate.- If the investment opportunity has
positive NPV (b > 0), the firm sells the asset-in-place. If the proceeds
cover the investment required (a > I), it goes ahead. But also goes ahead if
a I, because selling the asset-in-place reveals its true value. As we
showed above, differential information restricted to investment opportunities
never prevents a stock issue.- 
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This leads us to another "easy way out." The firm can simply spin off
its asset-in-place as a separately-financed company. In our model,
stockholders are better off ex ante holding holding two firms rather than one,
providing that the spinoff does not reduce the values of the distributions
A and/or B.
Mergers
Our model's main message is this: given differential information, a
firm with insufficient financial slack may not undertake all valuable in-
vestment opportunities. Thus a firm that has too little slack increases its
value by acquiring more.
One way to do this is by merger. A merger always increases value when
17/
one firm's surplus slack fully covers the other's deficiency.-
But the same conditions that create this potential gain will complicate
the merger negotiations and in some cases rule out any possibility of
their successful completion. Consider a firm with an existing business,
a good investment opportunity, but insufficient slack to pay for it. It
seeks a merger with a cash-rich firm. However, the would-be buyer only
knows the distributions A and B, not the true values a and b.
Let Q' be the proposed merger price. That is, if the merger offer
is accepted, the shareholders of the cash-poor firm receive Q' in cash.
If the offer is turned down, that firm's shareholders forego the investment
and are left with S + a. Thus, given a and b, the offer will be accepted
if Q' > S + a. But the cash-rich firm will only offer Q' = S + A (N') + B (N'),
where A(N') and B(N') are the expectations of A and conditional on observing
that the cash-poor firm is willing to go through with the deal.
Under these assumptions, the merger would never occur. The
cash-poor firm can always do better by issuing stock directly to investors,
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because P' always exceeds Q18/
The decision to sell shares always carries negative information, re-
gardless of whether the shares are sold to investors generally or to a
specific acquiring firm. The buyer or buyers discount the shares so that
cost equals expected payoff. If the firm issues E = I -S, old shareholders
retain a stake, but if their firm is sold they are completely disengaged
from it. The decision to sell all of the firm via merger, rather than
issue the fraction E/(P' + E), drives down market price below P' because the
firm has chosen to sell more stock than absolutely necessary to cover the
investment I. (We assume that (1) the acquiring firm's slack exceeds the
selling firm's deficiency (I - S), (2) the acquiring firm has other assets,
and (3) everyone knows what these assets are worth.)
Negotiated mergers thus seem to be ruled out regardless of financing,
because the cash-poor firm can always do better by issuing stock. How can
mergers be explained under the premises of this paper?
There are two possible explanations. First, there may be partial or total
19/disclosure of internal information during negotiation.-/ Second, the merger
may go through if the buyer rather than the seller takes the initiative. In
our model, firms with plenty of slack should seek out acquisition targets
which have good investment opportunities and limited slack, and about which
investors have limited information. Such firms sell at a discount from their
20/
average potential value A + B + S. A tender offer made directly to the
slack-poor firm's shareholders, at a price above A + B + S - L but below
A + B + S, makes both the bidder and the target's shareholders better off
ex ante, although neither buyer nor sellers know the true value a + b + S.
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A tender offer conveys no bad news about a + b + S so long as the target's
management are not accomplices. Perhaps this explains why most mergers are
initiated by buyers. A firm that actively seeks to be bought out may end up a
wallflower. The more actively management seeks to sell, the less an outsider
will assume their firm is worth.
4. THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL SLACK
We have assumed that ample financial slack allows the firm to avoid
external financing and to disentangle investment decisions from conflicts of
interest between old stockholders and new investors. There are scenarios,
however, in which such conflicts affect investment decisions even when slack
21/is ample.-2 We need to compare the behavior of the firm and its old
shareholders with and without slack.
The Irrelevance of Financing
Take the simplest case, in which the firm can only issue stock.
When the firm has inadequate slack (S < I) , we showed that the firm may
pass up valuable investment opportunities. We remarked that this loss would
be avoided if old stockholders could be compelled to buy and hold the new
issue--in other words to accept the new asset in their own portfolios. In
general this will not be their optimal portfolio strategy, however, so new
shareholders enter, creating the conflict.
Now suppose the firm has ample slack (S > I) . Old stockholders arrive
at t = 0 with shares representing a portfolio of three items: an asset in
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place, a growth opportunity and cash. If the growth opportunity is taken, the
cash vanishes, and the portfolio changes to two assets in place. The old
stockholders "buy" all of the new asset via the firm's internal financing.
But there is nothing to force them to hold it. The same portfolio motives
that would prevent them from buying all of a new issue should prompt them to
sell part of their shares if the firm uses its cash to buy a risky real asset.
There is no deadwight loss so long as the firm buys this asset whenever it
has positive NPV (b > 0) . But suppose managers start to worry about the
price old shareholders trade at when they rebalance their portfolios after an
internally-financed investment is made. Table 4 sets out equilibrium
conditions for this case. The left-hand block (Case I) shows old
shareholders' payoffs if the firm has no slack. We assume old shareholders
could buy all of the new issue. Therefore we earmark C = I dollars of cash
and other securities and take it as potentially available for investment.
However, their optimal portfolio calls for investing aI in the new issue.
The resulting equilibrium conditions are slight generalizations of those given
in Section 2 above.
In the right-hand block (Case II) the firm holds the same amount of cash
on behalf of old shareholders. If the firm invests this cash, they recoup
part of it by selling shares to raise (1 - a)I . Their fractional
ownership thus ends up as (P" - (1 - a)I)/P" . Note that P" , the market
price of the firm conditional on investment, includes the investment I .
It's convenient to substitute P" E P" - I .
net
At equilibrium, P" t= (M") + (M") , where M" indicates the states in
net
which investment by the firm is in the old shareholders' interest given the
price Pet facing them when they sell.
net
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It's evident that the equilibrium conditions for the two cases shown in
Figure 4 are identical. The firm's investment decision is independent of
whether cash starts out in the shareholders' bank accounts or the firms'. The
firm passes up good investment opportunities in the same states, so the ex
ante loss L is the same for the two cases. So are the market prices
conditional on the decision to invest: P' = P"
net
The choice between debt and equity financing should not matter either.
Suppose the starting position is Case I in Table 4. The firm borrows C = I
dollars from its stockholders. That transforms Case I into II, if the debt is
default-risk free. The final equilibrium investment decision and stock price
are unaffected.
If the debt carries default risk, old shareholders are exposed to the
firm's business risk through their new debt securities as well as their
stock. Therefore, when the firm invests, they will raise (1 - a)I by
selling a mixture of debt and equity securities--the same fraction of their
holdings of each. But the same final equilibrium is reached again.
If the risky debt is sold to outsiders, old shareholders would buy part of
the debt issue, and sell some of their shares. But as long as capital markets
are frictionless, and all traders understand what is going on, the final
result is the same.
We thus obtain a (MM) proposition of financial irrelevance, where all the
action comes from the firm's decision to invest. If this track is taken, our
model's empirical implications change. We could not explain firms' demand for
slack, their apparent preference for internal financing, or for debt over
equity issues. A fall in stock price on announcement of a stock issue would
be explained as an information effect. That is, the issue would not matter in
itself but only as a signal of the decision to invest.
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In order to defend our original formulation we must point to costs which
make financial arrangements relevant.
Trading Costs and Incomplete Markets
If old shareholders are willing to hold all of any new investment-i.e.,
if a = 1 in Table 4's expressions--the firm always invests if b > 0 .
This is, of course, the ex ante optimal policy; the problem is enforcing it.
Old shareholders could enforce it by purchasing 100 percent of any new issue
(Case I) or by not selling any of their shares (Case II). In frictionless and
complete capital markets they would do so. If that led to too much exposure
to the firm's risks, they could rebalance by selling other securities.
We therefore ask how a could be less than one in Case I, where the
firm has no slack and must issue stock to invest. First note that the
incentive for old shareholders to buy all of a new issue is strongest if they
act in concert. Management looks at the overall a . An investor who
holds, say, one percent of the firm's stock, and who acts alone, buying one
percent of the new issue, will reap only one percent of his action's rewards.
If arranging a group action is costly, then individual investors' incentives
to make a = 1 will be overcome by trading costs--not only the cost of
buying the new issue but also costs of hedging by trading in other
securities. Moreover, exact hedging will be impossible in incomplete capital
markets. If buying all of the new issue gives too much exposure to the firm's
22/
risks, selling other securities provides only an approximate hedge.-2 A
perfect hedge is achieved only by selling off part of the stock issue to new
shareholders.
In Case II, a = 1 if old shareholders do not trade when the firm
invests. Financial slack helps by making sure that old shareholders buy all
_Ixrs III____ ___
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of the new project, at least temporarily. Trading costs then limit the extent
of selling. If their portfolios are "sticky," the conflict of interest
between old and new shareholders is reduced.- / Thus the motive for the
firm to pass up positive-NPV projects should be weaker when the firm has ample
financial slack.
Information Costs and Management Behavior
The ex ante optimal policy is for managers to take all positive-NPV
projects-in other words, to act in the interests of all shareholders, old and
new, and ignore any conflicts of interest between them. A pledge to do so is
more believable if the firm has ample slack available. It is easier for
managers to ignore trades between old and new stockholders if the firm itself
is not involved in the trade. When stock is issued, managers have to worry
about whether the buyers are paying too much or too little.24/ When
investment is financed by slack, managers can find out who is selling to whom,
and estimate the trading price conditional on their decision to invest, but only
at extra cost. This cost supports a previously-announced policy of "always
taking positive-NPV investments."
Managers can also avoid conflicts between old and new shareholders by
concealing the firm's investment decision. Take Case II in Table 4, where the
firm has ample stock. Suppose its investment decision is not revealed until
t = +1. Then the firm's actions prompt no trading at t 0, and good
investment opportunities are not passed by. In Case I, on the other hand, the
investment decision cannot be concealed because a stock issue necessarily
comes first.
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Summary
Professional managers are said to "avoid the discipline of capital
markets," by accumulating financial slack in the form of marketable securities
or a blue-chip credit rating. In our model, this lack of discipline is a good
thing, if it allows managers to disentangle the investment decision from the
firm's stock price at t 0 --that is, to not worry about the share price
being too high or too low.
If managers do worry, and capital markets are frictionless and complete,
then slack doesn't help. However, we have given several reasons why slack may
make a policy of taking all positive-NPV projects easier to adhere to. Most of
our arguments rest on the premise that this is true.
Testing this premise directly would be extremely difficult. However, if
the model explains some aspects of financing behavior, that is a step forward.
5. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model of the issue-investment decision when the
firm's managers have superior information. We hesitate to state definite
empirical predictions, having ignored taxes, transaction costs, agency costs,
and other things the decision may depend on. We can nevertheless sum up by
reviewing the model's most interesting properties.
1. It is always better to issue safe securities than risky ones.
Firms should go to bond markets for external capital, but raise equity by
retention if possible. That is, external financing using debt is better
than financing by equity.
god · ~-~- -~-~- - ~ ~ ~ --
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2. The firm should not pay a dividend if it has to recoup the cash by
selling stock or some other risky security. Of course dividends could help
convey managers' superior information to the market. Our model suggests a
policy under which changes in dividends are highly correlated with managers'
estimate of the value of assets in place.26
3. Firms whose investment opportunities outstrip operating cash
flows, and which have used up their ability to issue low-risk debt, may
forego good investments rather than issue risky securities to finance them.
This is done in the existing stockholders' interest. However, stockholders
are better off ex ante--i.e., on average--when the firm carries sufficient
financial slack to undertake good investment opportunities as they arise.
The ex ante loss in value increases with the size of the required
equity issue. Thus, increasing the required investment or reducing slack
available for this investment also increases the ex ante loss. In addition,
numerical simulations indicate the loss decreases when the market's
uncertainty about the value of assets in place is reduced, or when the
investment opportunity's expected NPV is increased.
4. Firms can build up financial slack by restricting dividends when
investment requirements are modest. The cash saved is held as marketable
securities or.reserve borrowing power.
The other way to build slack is by issuing stock before cash is
required for investment. Firms would try to make such precautionary
issues in periods when managers' information advantage is small; they would
definitely issue in periods where managers have no information advantage.
However, we have not derived a generally optimal dynamic issue strategy.
III
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5. When managers have superior information, and stock is issued to
finance investment, stock price will fall.
6. A merger of a slack-rich and slack-poor firm increases the firms'
combined value. However, negotiating such mergers will be hopeless unless
the slack-poor firms' managers can convey their special information to the
prospective buyers. If this information cannot be conveyed (and verified),
slack-poor firms will be bought out by tender offers made directly to their
shareholders.
Of course the six items stated just above depend on the specific
assumptions of our model and may not follow in other contexts. We have
only explored one of many possible stories about corporate finance. A full
description of corporate financing and investment behavior will no doubt
require telling several stories at once.
A more comprehensive theory of financing policy would be a good initial
target for further research. Our model supplies a rationale for debt
financing even in the absence of taxes. On the other hand, a policy that
relies too heavily on debt increases the likelihood of bankruptcy costs and
agency costs or problems of moral hazard.7Z/ Firms may arrive at their
optimal debt policies by balancing these considerations.2 8 /
-aaaslu----·r-i^-- I-- ----------
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FOOTNOTES
1. Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and
National Bureau of Economic Research; Universidad Catolica de Chile. This
paper draws on Majluf [13] and an earlier (1978) joint working paper with
the same title as this one. The delay in revision is the senior author's fault.
2. We could interpret our time subscript not as calendar time, but just
the state of information available to the firm and market.
3. That is, managers may have inside information about the firm, but not
about the market or the economy.
4. An analogy may help make this clear. Think of a share of IBM stock on
January 1 (t = -1). A could be the unknown distribution of the February
1 price, a the actual price on February 1 (t = 0). However a fur trap-
per snowed in on the upper MacGregor River might not learn the February
1 price until March 1 (t = +1).
5. Rights issues resolve the conflict of interest only if old stockholders can be
compelled to exercise their rights and hold the newly-issued shares.
6. However, Grossman's recent paper [9] on product warranties is worth not-
ing because his underlying problem is like ours. There are also tempt-
ing analogies between our paper and the literature on credit rationing.
See, for example, Jaffee and Russell [11] and Stiglitz and Weiss [18, 19].
7. Downs and Heinkel [6] contains empirical evidence supporting the Leland-
Pyle analysis.
8. A formal proof is given in Majluf [13], Appendix 2, pps. 286-290. See
also pps. 142-143.
9. Majluf [131 shows that at least one equilibrium ' exists if the firm
issues stock. See his Appendix 1, pps. 279-285.
10. Reported in Majluf [13] pps. 165-183.
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11. That is, the change in the debt value at t = 1 is independent of
the firm-specific information revealed to investors at that time.
Other things, such as a general shift in interest rates, may change
debt value, but that is irrelevant here.
12. We know this from option-pricing theory. See, for example, Galai and
Masulis [7].
13. This is Rendleman's conclusion [14]. As noted above, he does not
work out a full equilibrium solution.
14. Old stockholders are always better off ex post if the firm is sure
to have positive NPV opportunity, i.e., if b is always positive.
In this case, the firm always issues stock, so P' = V_1 = A + B
If managers act in old stockholder's interest at t = 0, as we have
assumed, then P' < V_ = A + B - L.
15. What if only part of the asset-in-place can be sold? If it can be
sold at intrinsic value, the firm treats the proceeds as additional
slack and looks again at its issue-invest decision.
16. What if the asset in place can only be sold at a discount? What if
the potential buyer does not know its true value? What if sale of
the asset in place reduces b? These questions are worth exploring.
17. If the merged firms' total slack does not fully cover their investment
requirements, the merger may or may not increase value. See Majluf
[13], pps. 239-256.
__I_··I_ IsrLII ____
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18. A proof follows. Define a*(N') as the breakeven value of a, the
value at which the cash-poor firm is just indifferent to being
acquired at the equilibrium price Q'. Note that Q' = a*(N') + S.
Refer again to (la), the requirement for the firm to issue stock:
E
I' (S + a) < E + b
If P' were equal to Q', the firm would issue and invest at a*(N')
for any b > 0. That is, if
P' = Q' = S + a*(N') 
E E
(S + a) *(N') (S + a*(N')) = E < E + b
Thus a(M'), the breakeven value of a at which the firm is just
willing to issue stock, exceeds a*(N') for any b > 0.
A(M') + B(M') > A(N') + B(N') and P' > Q'.
19. The cash-poor firm would prefer to negotiate with a firm that is not
a competitor. A competitor might back out of the negotiations and take
advantage of information acquired in them. This hazard is less in a
"conglomerate" merger.
20. We assume the target firm has not yet declared its issue-invest
decision.
21. We thank George Constantinedes for suggesting this possibility.
22. A perfect hedge would require a perfectly correlated security backed
by some other firm or asset.
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23. However, any investor who sells out will not face the full cost of
his actions, since management's decision depends on old stockholders'
overall participation in the new project.
24. If old shareholders were committed to buy 100 percent of any new issue,
then the issue price would be irrelevant, just as the exercise price
of a rights issue is irrelevant. Such commitments do not exist for
public companies, partly for the reasons just noted, but also for other
reasons. For example, limited liability would not be worth much if
shareholders were compelled to buy any new issue voted by management and
directors. A firm could borrow money and use its shareholders' other
assets as collateral.
25. Of course trading goes on for other reasons. But this trading is
disconnected from the firm's actions and therefore irrelevant here.
26. However, there is no mechanism in our model to insure that such a
policy would be faithfully followed.
27. Agency costs and moral hazard problems exist only when managers
have superior information.
28. Chapter 6 of Majluf's thesis [131 has extended our model to cover
several cases of mixed debt and equity financing.
· I __ 1__11__
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